



## **Exploring the Ambivalent Voter in Taiwan's 2012 Presidential and Legislative Yuan Elections**

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### **Abstract**

This paper utilizes the post-electoral survey data produced by “Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study” Project (TEDS2012) to explore ambivalent voters in the 2012 presidential and legislative elections. Ambivalence is conceptualized and measured rather indirectly following the example of previous studies. In our analysis, the various kinds of ambivalence – including emotional, candidate, and party ambivalence – are found to be highly correlated with each other and form a complex syndrome consisting of positive and negative feelings. Sex, age, strength of partisan attachment, degree of political involvement, and evaluation of the incumbent’s performance and of the nation’s economy, along with cross pressure, are the most important predictors of the level of ambivalence. In Taiwan, more ambivalent electors are less likely to vote. Ambivalence is also found to have an effect on partisan vote-choice, and those who vote against their evaluation and beliefs are more likely to have a high degree of ambivalence.

**Keywords:** *ambivalence, emotional ambivalence, candidate (traits) ambivalence, party ambivalence*

**JEL classification:** *D72, D78, H11, Z18*





## 1. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to carry out a preliminary examination of ambivalent voters in the 2012 elections in Taiwan. In so doing, we start by deciding how to measure ambivalence. In psychology, ambivalence is understood to be a state of holding simultaneous, conflicting feelings toward an object. Conventionally, attitudes have been conceptualized as either uni-dimensional or bipolar, but theorists have increasingly challenged this universal view and recognized that many people experience conflicted feelings about objects they encounter in their lives (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin, 1995). People's ambivalence does not disappear, but is silenced; it is not trivialized, but it is hidden.

Ambivalence can occur when making political choices in which an individual experiences internalized conflicts between immensurate values (Alvarez and Brehm, 2002). Cognitive consistency theories predict that ambivalence should be minimal because individuals are motivated to reduce potential conflicts between their orientations. Festinger (1957) holds that ambivalence creates an important incentive to resolve itself effectively. Other theorists claim that most people have ambivalent attitudes toward most issues, and thus they build models depicting how mass opinion forms and changes on ambivalence deduction assumption (Zaller, 1992; Zaller and Feldman, 1992). Yet it is easier to acknowledge the mixed feelings that people have toward objects than it is to measure them properly. In political science, ambivalence has recently been studied quite extensively because it is recognized that conflict is the central feature of citizens' attitudes toward political issues (Craig and Martinez, 2005a, 2005b; Saris and Sniderman, 2004). I will make use of the insights contained in these studies to explore the issue of ambivalent voters in Taiwan's 2012 elections.

## 2. Taiwan's 2012 Elections

Competition was fierce in Taiwan's 2012 presidential and legislative elections. This was due to the decline in the approval rate of the incumbent president, Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九, and the recovery of the



opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) under its popular chairperson, Tsai Ing-wen 蔡英文. Briefly, many Taiwanese voters were torn between the two parties in the 2012 elections, and this is what makes these elections ideal for exploring the nature of ambivalent voters.

Thanks to the poor performance of the DPP administration of President Chen Shui-bian, coupled with allegations of corruption and abuse of authority, the Kuomintang (KMT) candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, easily won the presidential election of 2008. In his campaign Ma simply stressed that he would reverse Chen's misguided policies, allowing the Taiwanese electorate to hope that he would usher in an era of "clean politics". In 2008, Taiwan's economy was suffering from the global financial crisis, and this was exacerbated by the Beijing authorities' boycott of the increasingly pro-independence DPP government and the looming military threat from China. This international political situation paved the way for Ma's victory and the return to power of the KMT. Ma wooed the electorate by promising that he would seek more friendly relations with mainland China and proposing a "633 plan" for the economy.<sup>1</sup> Ma won the 2008 presidential election with 58.5 per cent of the popular vote, and Taiwan experienced its second peaceful transfer of power.

However, Ma's comfortable majority in the election did not give him a very long political honeymoon. President Ma's popularity quickly fell as his "633 plan" was revealed to be a bounced check. A year later, Taiwan was hit by its biggest typhoon ever, Typhoon Morakot. This disaster further undermined popular confidence in Ma and KMT's ability to manage a crisis. His leadership was seen as "indecisive" and he was accused of being unwilling to step on anyone's toes. He even managed to alienate former allies among the "pan-blue" coalition, while his pro-China stance further damaged his approval rating among native Taiwanese. Ma's effort to secure Taiwan's economic prosperity by means of the "Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement" (ECFA) with the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 2010 only deepened public mistrust in his leadership, both among his many Taiwanese supporters and members of the opposition "pan-green" parties, and led



some to question whether he was betraying Taiwan. However, during his first term, Ma was able to deliver more friendly relations with China, and this served Taiwan's economic interests, allowed it greater participation in international affairs, and reduced tension across the Taiwan Strait, as both Ma and the KMT-led government could claim to be acting in accordance with the so-called "1992 Consensus".

Under the leadership of Tsai Ing-wen, the opposition DPP was able to gain support as Ma's approval rating dropped. The DPP was undergoing a series of reforms and moving toward the centre of Taiwan's political landscape. The party toned down its calls for independence, adopting instead the view that "the Republic of China is Taiwan". In addition, Tsai Ing-wen turned her attention to the widening gap between rich and poor and class cleavages. Tsai has transformed the image of the DPP from that of a party of Taiwan independence to a more moderate one of that speaks about Taiwan's future. Having led the DPP to victory in several by-elections, Tsai was well-placed to be nominated as the DPP's presidential candidate to challenge President Ma. In the last few months before the 2012 election, some opinion polls put Ma only 3 per cent or less ahead of Tsai. The race between the two candidates was tight, but the campaign was peaceful and ended with incumbent Ma Ying-jeou was re-elected as President with 51.6 per cent of the popular vote. Following her election defeat (secured 45.63 per cent of the vote), Tsai Ing-wen resigned her post as chairperson of DPP.

### **3. Data and Measurement of Variables**

The present study utilizes data from a post-election survey of the 2012 presidential and legislative elections, TEDS 2012, part of Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS), an on-going large-scale survey funded by the National Science Council, Taiwan. A total of 1,827 respondents were randomly chosen from among eligible voters through a multi-level sampling frame. This data set has been made public for research and can be accessed at: <http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/modules/tinyd2/index.php?id=5>





Ambivalence occurs when respondents have “significant” positive and negative responses toward an attitudinal object. In the political sphere, attitudinal objects can be candidates, political parties, or policy issues. Various methods have been proposed to compute ambivalence based on a positive and negative scale, and these are reviewed and assessed by Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin (1995). They argue that a valid measure should incorporate two necessary and sufficient conditions of ambivalence. First, ambivalence necessitates two attitude components that are similar in magnitude. Second, ambivalence involves attitude components which are of at least moderate intensity. I follow Griffin’s numerical index proposed in Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin not only because it is adopted widely by others (Basinger and Lavine, 2005; Craig, Martinez, Kane and Gainous, 2005; Green, 2004; Keele, 2008; Lavine, 2001; Meffert, Guge and Lodge, 2004; Rudolph and Popp, 2007; Steenbergen and Brewer, 2004), but most importantly because it has been confirmed to have separately and independently considered both the similarity and intensity dimensions of ambivalent attitudes. The computational formula of Griffin’s index of ambivalence (p. 369) is:

$$\text{Ambivalence} = [P+N]/2 - |P-N|$$

where P represents the number of positive reactions to the attitudinal objects and N represents the negative reactions. Intensity is captured on the left by the average number of positive and negative components; similarity is expressed on the right by the absolute difference between the number of positive and negative components. As Thompson and associates point out, Griffin’s computational formula for ambivalence suggests that ambivalence can be seen as being equated to the intensity of the components corrected by the dissimilarity in their magnitude or polarization. Later, Lavine (2001: 919) further elaborated Griffin’s index and applied it to the construction of a comparative index of ambivalence about candidates and parties. For instance, the numerical formula for a comparative partisan ambivalence index is:

$$\text{Partisan Ambivalence} = [D+R]/2 - |D-R|$$





where D is the average of the positive reactions to the Democrats and the negative reactions to the Republicans (i.e.,  $D = [Pd+Nr]/2$ ), and R denotes the average of the positive reactions to the Republican and the negative reactions to the Democrats (i.e.,  $R = [Pr+Nd]/2$ ). I follow the same logic and adopt Lavine's index formula to construct indicators of emotional ambivalence, candidate (traits) ambivalence, and party ambivalence in my analysis of the ambivalent voter in Taiwan. The emotional ambivalence scale is calculated by the following formula:

$$\text{Emotional Ambivalence} = [(|Ts_e|+|Ma_e|)/2]-|Ts_e-Ma_e|$$

where  $Ts_e$  represents the average of positive emotional reactions to Tsai Ing-wen and negative emotional reactions to Ma Ying-jeou;  $Ma_e$  is the average of positive emotional reactions to Ma Ying-jeou and negative emotional reactions to Tsai Ing-wen. Because the information about emotion or affect regarding both candidates is based on closed-ended questionnaire items (see appendix for measurement and coding), only extreme responses, "often" or "never" (at the two opposite ends), are counted as "positive" or "negative", depending on the positive or negative wording. For example, when a respondent states that he/she "often" felt angry at what Tsai Ing-wen had done or said (negative wording) that is counted as a "negative" response for Tsai, while stating that he/she "never" felt that way counts as a "positive", and the other way round for a question with positive wording.

The construction of the scales of candidate ambivalence and party ambivalence also follows the same logic; however, the reactions are measured by different attitudinal objects. The objects selected for tapping evaluation of a candidate in the original questionnaire design are directed to collecting information about respondents' assessments on a scale of 0 to 10 of both Ma Ying-jeou's and Tsai Ing-wen's ability (or traits) to handle important national issues, understand people's needs, protect the nation's interests, and maintain peaceful cross-Strait relations. As shown in the factor analysis (Tables 1 and 2 in the appendix), both emotional reactions to and evaluation of two of the presidential candidates, Tsai Ing-wen and Ma Ying-jeou, are highly



polarized and can be nicely presented as a two-factor dimension. Because a 0-to-10 rating scale is applied in a closed-ended interview, only those rated 8-10 are counted as positive and those scoring 0-3 are considered negative reactions in order to highlight the “intensity” dimension of the positive and negative responses so as to meet the requirement of Griffin’s index. The candidate ambivalence scale is calculated by the following formula:

$$\text{Candidate Ambivalence} = [(|Ts_c| + |Ma_c|)/2] - |Ts_c - Ma_c|$$

where  $Ts_c$  and  $Ma_c$  represent the sum of positive or negative responses concerning the candidates’ ability to deal with the issues in question.

The items used to measure party ambivalence are designed to tap the relative capacity of the KMT and the DPP in handling ten critical issues which were raised or debated during the campaign period. These are: cross-Strait relations, economic development, the gap between rich and poor, high property prices, environmental protection, social welfare, corruption, democratic reform, ethnic harmony, and Taiwan’s international status. The party ambivalence index is constructed on a comparison of people’s perception of the ability of the DPP and the KMT to resolve these issues. As shown in the factor analysis (Appendix Table 3), people’s comparative evaluation of the DPP and the KMT is loaded on a single factor – a uni-dimensional phenomenon with high inter-item correlation. Accordingly, for each measure item, one positive response to a party, say the DPP, is also counted as a negative response to the other party, the KMT in this case. Those who said “both parties are pretty good” or “neither party is bad” or “don’t know” or “refuse to answer” are not included in the formula:<sup>2</sup>

$$\text{Party Ambivalence} = [(|DPP_c| + |KMT_c|)/2] - |DPP_c - KMT_c|$$

where  $DPP_c$  is the average count of positive evaluations of the DPP and negative evaluations of the KMT; and  $KMT_c$  represents the average count of positive evaluations of the KMT and negative evaluations of the DPP.



It is important to note that in many studies (e.g., Craig and Martinez, 2005a; 2005b), positive and negative responses for the index construction of “ambivalence” are built on responses of an open-ended question. My three ambivalence measures are based on a rating scale of closed-ended question items. Respondents’ answers to open-ended questions express considerations happens to be at the “top-of-the-head” at the time they are interviewed, so, as indicated earlier, only extreme responses at either end of the rating scale are taken into consideration in order to compensate for the possible defects of closed-ended questions. Even though the original data were not designed for this research purpose, I will show that these measures of ambivalence are quite valid in terms of their internal constraints (inter-index correlations) and external relationship with other variables.

Other measurements and indicators are listed in the tables in the appendix. Some composite indexes, such as Taiwanese nationalism vs. Chinese nationalism (Appendix Table 4) and economic evaluation (Appendix Table 5), are built on factor analysis, not only for the sake of parsimony but because they are by nature complex. Others are summated indicators.

#### **4. Hypotheses**


The core variable in this study is ambivalence. In common usage, ambivalence means a state of holding positive and negative feelings or conflicting beliefs simultaneously. According to consistency theory, these conflicting feelings would find a way out either through a change in one’s behaviour or an adjustment of one’s attitude components. However, topic on change in behaviour or attitude is not pursued here as we are using cross-sectional data. The purpose of this paper is to explore how ambivalence is affected by its possible antecedent factors and what is its consequent effect on voting behaviour (see Figure 1). Ambivalent voters in this study are those who hold mixed feelings, positive or negative, toward Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen and their respective parties. As mentioned earlier, ambivalence regarding a candidate or a party is measured indirectly and to some extent inferred from





psychological characteristics. From previous studies on ambivalence, some hypotheses concerning the antecedence and consequences of ambivalence can be formulated to test the Taiwan data.

**Figure 1** The Analytical Framework for Exploring the Relationship of Antecedents and Consequences of Ambivalence



First of all, we will look at the possible antecedent factors that have contributed to the ambivalence. Party identification has long been confirmed as the key factor guiding a citizen's vote-choice and other political attitudes toward policy. One would expect that voters with stronger partisan attachment would be less ambivalent, because the socialized partisan affect would function as a filter or a clue in orienting



their political preferences and choices. One important source of ambivalence that has been much studied is the contextual factor, namely cross-pressure embedded in one's social networks (Huckfeldt, Mendez and Osborn, 2004; Keele and Wolak, 2008; Mutz, 2003; Nir, 2005). It is expected that voters who experience more cross-pressure are more likely to be ambivalent. The effects of socio-demographic background variables on ambivalence are found not to be unitary in one previous study (Craig and Martinez, 2005a; 2005b), and in this study we include some of the most frequently used socio-demographic factors in the list of possible predictors. Even the most important demographic variable, i.e., education, is also found to have contradictory effects on ambivalence.<sup>3</sup>

*H1: The more strongly partisan voters are the less ambivalent they are.*

*H2: The more cross-pressure there is embedded in the voters' social networks, the more ambivalent they are.*

Second, ambivalence is a syndrome and can be a function of a variety of other related positive-negative orientations toward similar objects. Presumably, emotional ambivalence is also highly correlated with other aspects of ambivalence toward related attitudinal targets, such as candidate traits and party ambivalence. In Taiwan's case, given President Ma's low popularity rating, a voter's evaluation of the economic situation and of the president's performance would be expected to have an effect on emotional, candidate, and party ambivalence, which are measured by juxtaposing two competing candidates and parties. Political involvement is also an important predictor of ambivalence, as it is indexed by political discussion and concerns about the election result.

*H3: Ambivalence toward a candidate is positively correlated with ambivalence toward a party and structured into a single dimension.*

*H4: One's level of ambivalence can be predicted from one's level of political involvement, one's evaluation of the national economy, and – especially in the case of Taiwan – President Ma's performance.*





Finally, the consequence of ambivalence is tested to check whether ambivalence serves as a direct or indirect determinant of people's participation in voting and partisan vote-choice. There are various reasons why people fail to vote, one of which may be ambivalence. In Taiwan's presidential and legislative elections of 2012, the turnout rate was around 74.4 per cent, which is pretty high compared to other democracies. Competition was fierce and, as we mentioned earlier, the incumbent had a low approval rating and most voters considered that his administration was "unimpressive". In comparison, Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP was Taiwan's first female presidential candidate and her party was just beginning to recover its vitality having won several by-elections. Now that Ma's predecessor, Chen Shui-bian, was in jail, memories of the corruption case against him and his family were gradually fading away. It will be interesting to see whether loyal supporters of the DPP or the KMT, or those who voted for either Tsai Ing-wen or Ma Ying-jeou, exhibit different levels of ambivalence, whether emotional ambivalence or ambivalence toward candidate traits or party perspectives.

*H5: Ambivalence is a significant predictor of people's likelihood of voting.*

*H6: The degree of ambivalence toward candidate and party of those who voted for Tsai Ing-wen is different from that of those who voted for Ma Ying-jeou.*

Of course, many non-trivial hypotheses can be put forward, and these will be discussed in the text rather than underlined here.

## **5. Data Analysis, Findings and Discussion**

Our measure of ambivalence is very indirect and manipulated in quite a technical way by counting both the positive and the negative responses toward the same attitudinal object. First, emotional, candidate, and party ambivalence are mainly used to highlight individuals' mixed overall feelings, evaluations, and beliefs about the competing candidates, Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen, and their respective parties, the KMT and the DPP. They each have their own discernible personal style and





political stance. These measures of ambivalence range from  $-.05$  to  $+.05$ , and we classify those with a negative score as “unambivalent”, those with a zero score as “indifferent”, and those with a positive score as “ambivalent”. As indicated in Table 1, most respondents are not ambivalent and less than 14 per cent of the voter sample is classified as exhibiting emotional ambivalence, the smallest group of all. Of the three categories of ambivalence, those exhibiting party ambivalence constitute the largest group, although they only represent 22.46 per cent of the whole sample and 21.70 of the voter sample. Very few people (1.6 per cent) exhibit all the categories of ambivalence; they are indeed the most ambivalent. And the even distribution of the “unambivalent” in the first column shows that most people exhibit at least one category of ambivalence or indifference, while only 39.2 per cent of respondents are “purely” unambivalent. In a word, ambivalence is a matter of degree, and conflicting feelings about candidates and parties are quite prevalent among Taiwanese.

Ambivalence toward candidates is assumed to be highly correlated with ambivalence toward parties, and this may be a result of a convergence process caused by electoral campaigning. In our study, there is a significant correlation between emotional, candidate, and party ambivalence, even after two scales of validity checks. One index is constructed on the number of “all parties are good” responses, which is an expression of positive but mixed feelings about the two competing parties. The other index is built on the number of “neither party is good” responses, which express negative mixed feelings. These two indicators are intended to measure the magnitude of that group of voters with embedded conflicting feelings and beliefs. The significance of inter-correlations among the indicators of ambivalence, as reported in table 3, not only serves as a validity check for measures of ambivalence but speaks for the complexity of ambivalence. To further show the distinct nature of these measured properties and the similarity between them, a factor analysis is applied to this reduction purpose, and, as indicated in Table 4, emotional, candidate, and party ambivalence indicators do converge into the same factor structure, and the other two indicators are loaded on the other factor dimension. This finding confirms H4 above.



**Table 1** Distribution of Emotional, Candidate and Party Ambivalence

	Emotional ambivalence		Candidate ambivalence		Party ambivalence	
	Whole	Voter	Whole	Voter	Whole	Voter
Unambivalent	64.41	66.30	58.10	60.70	65.38	67.20
Indifferent	21.09	19.80	24.62	22.70	12.17	11.10
Ambivalent	14.50	13.90	17.28	16.50	22.46	21.70
Total <i>N</i>	1759	1571	1759	1571	1759	1571

Source: TEDS2012.

**Table 2** Distribution of Ambivalence and Lack of Ambivalence by Count

	Unambivalent		Ambivalent	
	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%
None	258	14.7	1053	59.9
1.00	386	21.9	486	27.6
2.00	426	24.2	192	10.9
3.00	689	39.2	28	1.6
Total	1759	100.0	1759	100.0

Source: TEDS2012.

**Table 3** Bivariate Correlation between Ambivalence and Party Evaluation

	Emotional ambivalence	Candidate ambivalence	Party ambivalence	All parties good
Emotional ambivalence	1			
Candidate ambivalence	0.522***	1		
Party ambivalence	0.342***	0.455***	1	
All parties good	0.245***	0.203***	0.205***	1
All parties bad	0.121***	0.218***	0.202***	-0.078**

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$  (2-tailed, listwise  $N = 1759$ )

Source: TEDS2012.

**Table 4** Factor Analysis of Ambivalence Indicators (Varimax rotated)

Ambivalence indicators	Factor loading	
	<i>F1</i>	<i>F2</i>
1) <i>Emotional ambivalence</i>	<b>.759</b>	-.115
2) <i>Candidate ambivalence</i>	<b>.819</b>	.069
3) <i>Party ambivalence</i>	<b>.727</b>	.081
4) <i>All parties good</i>	.438	<b>-.676</b>
5) <i>All parties bad</i>	.349	<b>.778</b>
Eigenvalues	2.089	1.067
% of Variance explained	41.78	21.74
Valid <i>N</i>	1759	

Source: TEDS2012.

## 6. The Antecedents of Ambivalence

In order to explore the causes of ambivalence, I select those variables that serve as significant predictors of at least one of the three aspects of ambivalence after a preliminary analysis (see Figure 1). Other variables that are often used as independent variables are omitted, not because of their lack of theoretical importance but because of their irrelevance where our empirical data are concerned. As reported in Table 5, regression analysis of emotional, candidate, and party ambivalence produces some interesting findings concerning the possible determinants of ambivalence. First, gender affects candidate ambivalence and party ambivalence but does not affect emotional ambivalence. Males exhibit more candidate and party ambivalence than do females. Second, age is a significant predictor of ambivalence of all kinds; the older one is the less likely one is to exhibit emotional, candidate, or party ambivalence. Education is a significant predictor of candidate ambivalence and party ambivalence, as those with more education are more likely to hold mixed feelings about candidates and parties. This seems to confirm Rudolph and Popp's (2007) finding about the positive effect of education on partisan and candidate ambivalence. More education signals a greater capacity to process different kinds of information simultaneously, and thus an ability to hold conflicting views on candidates and parties. Party identification is also a significant predictor of candidate and party ambivalence; Taiwanese who identify more with the DPP (pan-green) have greater candidate and party ambivalence. This finding hints that KMT identifiers hold more congruent views and are therefore less hesitant about supporting their own candidate and party. The significant causal relationship between partisan strength and ambivalence supports hypothesis H1, that the stronger a voter's partisan attachment the less ambivalent he/she will be. In Taiwan, the issue of Taiwan independence vs. unification with China (or *tongdu* 統獨 in Chinese) has been a rallying point of electoral mobilization and policy debates between the parties since the early 1990s. A voter's position on the independence-unification continuum is a reflection partly of his/her partisan orientation, and partly of his/her national identity, and it is a significant

**Table 5** OLS Regression Analysis of Ambivalence

Predictor Variable	Dependent Variable		
	Emotional Ambivalence (Beta Coef.)	Candidate Ambivalence (Beta Coef.)	Party Ambivalence (Beta Coef.)
Sex (male)	0.083	0.163**	0.201***
Age	-0.006**	-0.010***	-0.010***
Level of education	0.019	0.058**	0.059**
Party identification	-0.015	0.071***	0.134***
Partisan strength	-0.240***	-0.255***	-0.190***
Self-assigned <i>tongdu</i> position	-0.059*	-0.032	-0.117***
Political involvement	-0.271***	-0.159**	-0.155**
Political efficacy	0.009	-0.057	-0.095*
Cross pressure	0.108***	0.124***	0.138***
Ma's performance	0.172***	0.125***	0.011
Economic evaluation	-0.066*	-0.083**	-0.095**
Taiwan nationalism	0.030	-0.045	-0.044
China nationalism	0.058*	0.032	-0.030
Constant	1.012***	0.383	0.440
Valid <i>N</i>	985	985	985
Adjusted <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.276	0.260	0.261

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Source: TEDS2012.





predictor of party ambivalence, as Taiwanese voters who lean more toward the Taiwan independence position exhibit less emotional and party ambivalence. Chinese nationalism, however, is only a significant predictor of emotional ambivalence, in that voters who favour unification have more ambivalent emotional reactions toward candidates. Political involvement, measured by frequency of discussing politics with others and being concerned about the election outcome, is also a very significant predictor of emotional, candidate, and party ambivalence. Voters who are more involved in politics have less emotional, candidate, and party ambivalence. Political efficacy is only a significant predictor of party ambivalence, and voters with more political efficacy exhibit less party ambivalence. The main contextual factor influencing individual political behaviour is cross pressure; in our analysis of Taiwanese data as reported in Table 5, Taiwanese who experience greater cross pressure in their social networks have more emotional, candidate, and party ambivalence, which confirms H2.

The overall evaluation of President Ma's administration was the major reason for the decline in his approval rating, together with the country's lackluster economic performance and the failure of his "633" proposal. According to our analysis of the data, Taiwanese who felt more satisfied with Ma's overall performance had significantly more emotional ambivalence and candidate ambivalence, but not party ambivalence (see Table 5). Taiwanese whose evaluation of the economy was more positive exhibited less emotional, candidate, and party ambivalence. To sum up, the most salient antecedent factors of emotional, candidate, and party ambivalence are age, strength of partisan attachment, political involvement, evaluation of President Ma's overall performance, and evaluation of the economy. Gender, education, and party identification are significant predictors of candidate and party ambivalence. Orientation regarding independence vs. unification is also a significant factor in predicting one's emotional and party ambivalence, and a constructed variable which implies the same property, China nationalism, only matters as a predictor of emotional ambivalence.





## 7. The Consequences of Ambivalence

Much of the previous literature on the consequences of ambivalence is concerned with information seeking, instability of attitudes, and resistance to persuasion, and it is mostly in the field of public opinion studies. In this paper, we choose participation in voting and partisan vote-choice as the final dependent variables to examine whether or not ambivalence has a direct effect after controlling for other major explanatory factors. First, we include possible independent variables, including ambivalence variables, in the equations to predict participation in voting among Taiwanese, as shown in model 1 in Table 6 and carry out re-analysis by dropping those statistically insignificant variables and results listed in model 2. It is found that the only robust and significant predictor of people's participation in voting is emotional ambivalence. Other things being equal, electors who did not vote in the 2012 elections are more likely to be younger, less politically involved, have experienced greater cross pressure, and to exhibit more emotional ambivalence, and this finding supports hypothesis H5. The explanatory power of the sum of all these factors is around 20 per cent, as indicated by the pseudo  $R^2$  coefficients in Table 6.

We turn next to the explanatory models we propose in the analysis of Taiwanese partisan vote-choice. Model 1 is a fully saturated model containing most of the predictors used in previous studies of Taiwanese electoral choice plus ambivalence variables. Models 2 and 3 are reduced models of re-analysis which leave out some insignificant variables. The difference between model 2 and model 3 is that in model 3 the education variable is kept out of the equation. If the education variable is left out, the direct effects of candidate ambivalence and party ambivalence become significant and the explanatory power of the model is no different, as indicated by pseudo  $R^2$  in Table 7. As shown in model 3, mainlanders are less likely to have voted for Tsai Ing-wen than Taiwanese. Pro-independence Taiwanese are more likely to have voted for Tsai Ing-wen than for Ma Ying-jeou; and those who identify more with the DPP are more likely to have voted for Tsai Ing-wen than for Ma Ying-jeou, as one might predict. In addition, the negative effect of evaluation of Ma's performance on the odds of voting for Tsai Ing-wen



**Table 6** Logistic Regression Analysis of Voting Participation

Predictor Variable	Voting Participation as Dependent Variable	
	Model 1 Nonvoter	Model 2 Nonvoter
Sex (male)	0.35	—
Age	-0.07***	-0.06***
Family income	-0.04	—
Level of education	-0.12	—
Ethnic origins (Taiwanese as base)		
Hakka	-0.10	—
Mainlanders	0.03	—
Self-assigned position on <i>tongdu</i>	-0.06	—
Party identification (pan-DPP)	-0.11	—
Partisan strength	-0.14	—
Political involvement	-0.85**	-1.09***
Political efficacy	0.09	—
Cross pressure	0.29**	0.25**
Evaluation of Ma's performance	0.12	—
Emotional ambivalence	0.31	<b>0.31*</b>
Candidate ambivalence	0.08	0.09
Party ambivalence	0.21	0.22
Constant Term	3.47*	2.09**
Valid <i>N</i>	983	1207
pseudo <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.196	0.194

Voter as base category ; \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Source: TEDS2012.

**Table 7** Logistic Regression Analysis of Partisan Vote-choice

Predictor Variable	Partisan Vote-choice as Dependent Variable		
	Model 1 voted Tsai	Model 2 voted Tsai	Model 3 voted Tsai
Ethnic origins (Taiwanese as base)			
Hakka	0.08	0.05	0.03
Mainlanders	-2.34**	-2.44**	-2.44**
Level of education	0.11	0.07	—
Self-assigned position on <i>tongdu</i>	0.41**	0.45**	0.43**
Party identification (pan-DPP)	1.43***	1.43***	1.43***
PID strength	-0.03	—	—
Political involvement	0.16	—	—
Political efficacy	-0.26	—	—
Cross pressure	0.12	0.13	0.13
Evaluation of Ma's performance	-0.81***	-0.83***	-0.83***
Emotional ambivalence	-0.31	-0.34	-0.34
Candidate ambivalence	0.33	0.36	<b>0.37<sup>#</sup></b>
Party ambivalence	0.32	0.34	<b>0.36*</b>
Constant Term	-8.20***	-8.36***	-7.82***
Valid <i>N</i>	938	949	951
pseudo <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.749	0.748	0.748

Voted-Ma as base category; \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , #  $p = .052$   
 Source: TEDS2012.



shows that those who were more dissatisfied with Ma's administration were significantly more likely to cast their vote for Tsai than for Ma. Finally, Taiwanese voters who exhibit greater candidate ambivalence and party ambivalence are more likely to have voted for Tsai than for Ma, and this partially confirm our hypothesis (H6).

In order to identify more ambivalent voters, we further cross tabulate the voter's partisan vote-choice with his/her position on independence/unification and whether he/she was satisfied or dissatisfied with Ma's overall performance (see Appendix Tables 6 and 7). This will identify two types of split voters: one is split on partisan vote-choice and independence/unification position (a voter who favours unification would be expected to vote for Ma, while a pro-independence voter would be expected to vote for Tsai, since the KMT and the DPP, and the two candidates, have clear stances on independence/unification), while the other type of split voter exhibits inconsistency between partisan choice and evaluation of Ma's performance. Voters who are satisfied with Ma's performance would be predicted to vote for Ma and those who are dissatisfied would cast their vote for Tsai.

Tables 8, 9 and 10 present the magnitude of these two types of split-voting and these voters' level of emotional, candidate, and party ambivalence. We can see that all split voters exhibit more of all three kinds of ambivalence in our analysis. They are indeed entitled to be called "ambivalent voters". Others may exhibit a certain degree of ambivalence but this is not expressed in their final vote-choices.

## **8. Conclusion**

Most people exhibit at least some degree of ambivalence, given that they are exposed to both positive and negative information and they hold conflicting feelings toward attitudinal objects. Ambivalence might be more salient during elections since competing parties or candidates tend to release large quantities of information that highlights their own good points and their opponent's bad ones, and this can make it difficult for voters to make up their minds. In our initial analysis of both ambivalence and vote-choice, those variables representing the volume of



**Table 8** Mean Test for Ambivalence and Split-Voting in Party and Taiwan-China Position

Vote-choice and self-assigned position on <i>tongdu</i>		Emotional Ambivalence	Candidate Ambivalence	Party Ambivalence
Split-voter	Mean	-.0700	-.0740	-.0956
	<i>N</i>	114	114	114
Consistent voter	Mean	-.1240	-.1096	-.1556
	<i>N</i>	1457	1457	1457
Total	Mean	-.1201	-.1071	-.1512
	<i>N</i>	1571	1571	1571
<i>F</i>		9.80	3.48	7.28
Eta Coef.		.079**	.048 <sup>#</sup>	.068**

#  $p=.06$ , \*\*  $p<.01$ 

Source: TEDS2012.

**Table 9** Mean Test for Ambivalence and Split-Voting among Those Satisfied and Dissatisfied with Ma

Vote-choice and Ma's performance		Emotional Ambivalence	Candidate Ambivalence	Party Ambivalence
Split-voter	Mean	-.0540	-.0215	-.0322
	<i>N</i>	241	241	241
Consistent voter	Mean	-.1320	-.1226	-.1728
	<i>N</i>	1330	1330	1330
Total	Mean	-.1201	-.1071	-.1512
	<i>N</i>	1571	1571	1571
<i>F</i>		40.23	55.73	80.86
Eta Coef.		.158***	.185***	.221***

\*\*\*  $p<.001$ 

Source: TEDS2012.

**Table 10** Logistic Regression Analysis of Ambivalent Voters (Split-voting)

Predictor variable	Dependent Variable			
	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 2a	Model 2b
	Split- <i>Tongdu</i> ( <i>Tongdu</i> -PV-consistent)	Split- <i>Tongdu</i> ( <i>Tongdu</i> -PV-consistent)	Split-Perform (Perform-PV-consistent)	Split-Perform (Perform-PV-consistent)
<b>Sex (male)</b>	0.15		<b>-0.44*</b>	-0.29
Age	-0.01		0.01	
Level of education	0.03		0.18	0.10
Ethnic origins (Taiwanese)				
Hakka	-0.20		0.72*	0.66**
Mainlanders	-0.59		0.54	<b>0.55*</b>
Party identification (pan-DPP)	-0.07		0.16*	<b>0.19***</b>
Partisan strength	0.13		-0.03	
Political involvement	0.08		0.09	
<b>Ma's performance</b>	0.13	<b>0.32**</b>	—	—
Self- <i>tongdu</i> -position	—	—	0.04	-0.01
Political knowledge	-0.01		0.02	
Political efficacy	-0.05		-0.52***	<b>-0.40***</b>
<b>Political trust</b>	-0.33		0.70	<b>0.74**</b>
Cross pressure	-0.06		0.02	
Media exposure	-0.28		-0.24	0.06
Economic evaluation	0.07		0.04	
<b>Taiwan-nationalism</b>	0.06	-0.06	<b>0.28*</b>	0.17
China-nationalism	<b>0.40**</b>	<b>0.50***</b>	-0.03	-0.01
Emotional ambivalence	<b>2.67*</b>	<b>1.70*</b>	3.13***	2.75***
Candidate ambivalence	0.40	-0.63	<b>1.38*</b>	0.93
Party ambivalence	0.72	<b>1.05*</b>	2.04***	1.87***
Constant Term	-0.26	-2.40***	-3.71*	-3.42***
Valid <i>N</i>	770	1401	771	1115
pseudo <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.075	0.057	0.167	0.133

*Consistent Voter* as base category ; \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Source: TEDS2012.



information available to the respondent, such as political knowledge and media exposure, are found to have no significant impact on ambivalence and partisan vote-choice.

The 2012 presidential and legislative elections in Taiwan provide a good setting to explore ambivalence, although the measure of ambivalence is indirect and may not capture the full complexity of the concept. Yet our analysis of the data did confirm some of the findings of previous studies. To sum up, Taiwanese voters may well exhibit ambivalence in terms of conflicting emotions toward competing candidates and parties, and we found that these areas of ambivalence are determined firstly by such socio-demographic variables as gender, age, and education, and secondly by some political orientations, such as party identification, views on independence/unification, political involvement, evaluation of incumbent's performance, and evaluation of the economy. Finally, partisan strength and cross pressure are the most common and important factors in assessing ambivalence.

In Taiwan, ambivalence may serve as a significant predictor of failure to vote and also contribute to an understanding of partisan vote-choice and of inconsistent voting.

## Notes

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1. The promise was for a 6 per cent economic growth rate, an unemployment rate of less than 3 per cent, and per capita income of more than US\$30,000.
2. Those who responded with “both parties are good” or “both parties are bad” are more likely to display greater ambivalence. I used this information to build indexes as a validity check for our ambivalence measure.
3. Craig, Kane and Martinez (2002) point out that ambivalence on abortion tends to be greater among those with fewer years of formal education; however, Rudolph and Popp (2007) found that education increases “open-minded thinking” about candidates, so they link more information with greater ambivalence toward candidates.

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




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**Appendix Figure 1** President Ma's Approval Rating, 2008-2013



Note: Pollsters are not permitted to publish the results of surveys concerning candidates during the election period, so there are no data for 2011/10 and 2012/04.

Source: Global Views Survey Research Center. <<http://www.gvsr.net.tw>>

**Appendix Table 1** Factor Analysis of Emotional Responses to Candidates (Varimax Rotated)

Measure Item	Factor loading	
	F1	F2
1a) <i>Tsai Ing-wen made you feel angry</i>	<b>.886</b>	-.022
1b) <i>Ma Ying-jeou made you feel angry</i>	-.068	<b>.891</b>
2a) <i>Tsai Ing-wen made you feel afraid</i>	<b>.881</b>	-.102
2b) <i>Ma Ying-jeou made you feel afraid</i>	-.068	<b>.890</b>
3a) <i>Tsai Ing-wen made you feel hopeful</i>	<b>-.680</b>	.397
3b) <i>Ma Ying-jeou made you feel hopeful</i>	.447	<b>-.619</b>
4a) <i>Feeling toward Tsai Ing-wen (on scale of 0 to 10)</i>	<b>.748</b>	-.326
4b) <i>Feeling toward Ma Ying-jeou (on scale of 0 to 10)</i>	-.441	<b>.695</b>
Eigenvalues	2.987	2.726
% of Variance explained	37.33	34.08
Valid N	1505	

Source: TEDS2012.

**Appendix Table 2** Factor Analysis of Candidate Traits Measures  
(Varimax Rotated)

Measure item for tapping evaluation of candidate's trait	Factor Loading	
	<i>F1</i>	<i>F2</i>
1) <i>Tsai Ing-wen's ability to do president's job</i>	<b>.900</b>	-.154
2) <i>Ma Ying-jeou's ability to do president's job</i>	-.160	<b>.912</b>
3) <i>Tsai Ing-wen's understanding of the needs of ordinary people</i>	<b>.896</b>	-.133
4) <i>Ma Ying-jeou's understanding of the needs of ordinary people</i>	-.155	<b>.902</b>
5) <i>Tsai Ing-wen's ability to protect Taiwan's interests</i>	<b>.911</b>	-.193
6) <i>Ma Ying-jeou's ability to protect Taiwan's interests</i>	-.183	<b>.920</b>
7) <i>Tsai Ing-wen's ability to maintain cross-Strait peace</i>	<b>.850</b>	-.187
8) <i>Ma Ying-jeou's ability to maintain cross-Strait peace</i>	-.163	<b>.810</b>
Eigenvalues	3.275	3.261
% of Variance explained	40.94	40.76
Valid <i>N</i>	1528	

Source: TEDS2012.

**Appendix Table 3** Factor Analysis of Evaluations of KMT and DPP

Measure item for evaluation of two parties	Factor loading
	<i>F1</i>
1) <i>On cross-Strait relations, how do you think the KMT and DPP compare?</i>	<b>.743</b>
2) <i>On economic development, how do the two parties compare?</i>	<b>.792</b>
3) <i>On reducing the gap between rich and poor, how do the two parties compare?</i>	<b>.803</b>
4) <i>On resolving the problem of high property prices, how do the two parties compare?</i>	<b>.749</b>
5) <i>On environmental protection, how do the two parties compare?</i>	<b>.698</b>
6) <i>On social welfare, how do the two parties compare?</i>	<b>.765</b>
7) <i>On fighting corruption, how do the two parties compare?</i>	<b>.786</b>
8) <i>On democratic reform, how do the two parties compare?</i>	<b>.768</b>
9) <i>On ethnic harmony, how do the two parties compare?</i>	<b>.800</b>
10) <i>On raising our international status, how do the two parties compare?</i>	<b>.790</b>
Eigenvalues	5.93
% of Variance explained	59.30
Valid <i>N</i>	1269

Source: TEDS2012.

**Appendix Table 4** Factor Analysis of Taiwanese/Chinese Nationalism Items (Varimax Rotated)

Item for measuring Taiwan/Chinese nationalism	Factor loading	
	F1	F2
1) <i>If Taiwan could still maintain peaceful relations with the PRC after declaring independence, then Taiwan should establish a new, independent country</i>		<b>.822</b>
2) <i>Even if the PRC decides to attack Taiwan after Taiwan declares independence, Taiwan should still become a new country</i>		<b>.830</b>
3) <i>If the economic, social, and political conditions were about the same in both mainland China and Taiwan, then the two sides should unify</i>	<b>.830</b>	
4) <i>Even if the gap between the economic, social, and political conditions in mainland China and Taiwan is quite large, the two sides should still unify</i>	<b>.837</b>	
Eigenvalues	1.39	1.37
% of Variance explained	34.82	34.26
Valid N	1594	

Source: TEDS2012.

**Appendix Table 5** Factor Analysis of Sociotropic and Pocketbook Economic Evaluations

Measure Item	Factor loading
	F1
1) <i>Sociotropic retrospective economic evaluation</i>	<b>.728</b>
2) <i>Sociotropic prospective economic evaluation</i>	<b>.749</b>
3) <i>Pocketbook retrospective economic evaluation</i>	<b>.718</b>
4) <i>Pocketbook prospective economic evaluation</i>	<b>.746</b>
Eigenvalues	2.163
% of Variance explained	54.080
Valid N	1443

Source: TEDS2012.

**Appendix Table 6** Cross-tabulation for Self-*Tongdu*-Position and Partisan Vote-choice

<i>Tong-du</i> Position	Vote choice		Total
	voted-Tsai	voted-Ma	
Pro-independence	248 73.8%	88 26.2%	336 100.0%
Status quo	255 31.9%	545 68.1%	800 100.0%
Pro-unification	32 17.6%	150 82.4%	182 100.0%
Total	535 40.6%	783 59.4%	1318 100.0%

$\chi^2=218.91$  ( $df=2$ );  $\text{Eta}=.408^{***}$

\*  $p<.05$ , \*\*  $p<.01$ , \*\*\*  $p<.001$

Source: TEDS2012.

**Appendix Table 7** Cross-tabulation for Ma's Performance and Partisan Vote-choice

Ma's Performance	Vote choice		Total
	voted-Tsai	voted-Ma	
Dissatisfied	384 80.7%	92 19.3%	476 100.0%
(DK UA)	19 46.3%	22 53.7%	41 100.0%
Satisfied	142 17.1%	690 82.9%	832 100.0%
Total	545 40.4%	804 59.6%	1349 100.0%

$\chi^2=509.34$  ( $df=2$ );  $\text{Eta}=.614^{***}$

\*  $p<.05$ , \*\*  $p<.01$ , \*\*\*  $p<.001$

Source: TEDS2012.

**Appendix Table 8** Measures and Coding of Variables and Indicators in Use

<b>Variable/ Indicator</b>	<b>Measures/Coding</b>
<b>Age</b>	Age in years in survey year (2012)
<b>Sex</b>	Respondent's gender (1=male; 0=female)
<b>Level of Education</b>	A recoded 10-point scale : (1=No formal education; 2=incomplete elementary school; 3=complete elementary school; 4=incomplete middle school; 5=complete middle school; 6=incomplete high school; 7=complete high school; 8=some university education; 9=university education completed; 10=post-graduate degree.)
<b>Family Income</b>	10-point scale of monthly household income: (1=lowest percentile; 10=highest percentile.)
<b>Ethnic Identity</b>	3-point numerical scale: <i>Do you consider yourself as Taiwanese, Chinese or both?</i> (1=Taiwanese; 2=both; 3=Chinese)
<b>Ethnic Origins</b>	Based on respondent's ethnic background on father's side. (1=Taiwanese; 2=Hakka; 3=Mainland Chinese)
<b>Party Identification (pan-KMT to pan-DPP)</b>	Constructed 7-point index based on one measure item and follow-up based on two measure items: 1) <i>Among the main political parties in our country, do you think of yourself as leaning toward any particular party?</i> 2) <i>Which party if any do you feel closest to?</i> 3) <i>How close do you feel to that party?</i> (1=very close to pan-KMT; ... 4=non-partisan; ... 7=very close to pan-DPP)
<b>Partisan Strength</b>	Based on a measure item: <i>Do you lean very strongly, somewhat, or just a little toward this party?</i> (0=not affiliated with any party; 1=just a little; ... 4=very strongly)

**Appendix Table 8** (Continued)

<b>Variable/ Indicator</b>	<b>Measures/Coding</b>
<b>Political Involvement</b>	<p>A summated index based on two 4-point scale measure items:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) <i>Do you usually talk about politics or elections with other people?</i> (1=never; ... 4=often)</li> <li>2) <i>Were you concerned with the outcome of this presidential election?</i> (1=not concerned at all; ... 4=very concerned)</li> </ol>
<b>Political Efficacy</b>	<p>A summated index based on three 5-point scale measure items:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) <i>People like me don't have any say in what the government does.</i> (1=strongly agree; ... 5=strongly disagree)</li> <li>2) <i>Public officials do not care much about what people like me think.</i> (1=strongly agree; ... 5=strongly disagree)</li> <li>3) <i>Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on.</i> (1=strongly agree; ... 5=strongly disagree)</li> </ol>
<b>Political Trust</b>	<p>A summated index based on three 4- and 5-point scale measure items:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) <i>Most decisions made by the government are correct.</i> (5=strongly agree; ... 1=strongly disagree)</li> <li>2) <i>Government officials often waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes.</i> (1=strongly agree; ... 5=strongly disagree)</li> <li>3) <i>When the government decides important policies, how often do you think public welfare is its first priority?</i> (4=often; ... 1=never)</li> <li>4) <i>Do you believe what government officials say on TV or in newspapers?</i> (4=strongly believe; ... 1=not believe at all)</li> </ol>
<b>Political Knowledge</b>	<p>A summated index based on the correct answer for 7 measure items:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) <i>Who is the current president of the United States?</i></li> <li>2) <i>Who is the current the premier of our country?</i></li> <li>3) <i>What institution has the power to interpret the constitution?</i></li> </ol>



**Appendix Table 8** (Continued)

Variable/ Indicator	Measures/Coding
<b>Political Knowledge</b> (Continued)	<p>4) <i>Which of these persons was the finance minister before the recent election?</i></p> <p>5) <i>What was the unemployment rate in Taiwan as of the end of last year (2011)?</i></p> <p>6) <i>Which party came in second in terms of seats in the Legislative Yuan?</i></p> <p>7) <i>Who is the current secretary-general of the United Nations?</i></p> <p>(7=7correct items; ... 0=none correct answer)</p>
<b>Media Exposure</b>	<p>A summated index built on 6-point measure items:</p> <p>1) <i>During the campaign, on average how many days a week did you watch election news on TV?</i></p> <p>2) <i>What about election news on the radio?</i></p> <p>3) <i>What about election news on the internet?</i></p> <p>4) <i>What about election news in the newspapers?</i></p> <p>(6=more than 2 hours; ... 0=paid no attention at all )</p>
<b>Cross Pressure</b>	<p>An index built on an item designed to tap the magnitude of homogeneity of social network in terms of partisan support:</p> <p><i>Do these people who you commonly discuss politics or elections with support the same party?</i></p> <p>(1=all support the same party or with only person; ... 3=about half and half; ... 5=none supports the same party)</p>
<b>Evaluation of President Ma's Performance</b>	<p>A Likert 4-point measure item:</p> <p><i>Concerning Ma Ying-jeou's overall performance during his presidency, are you satisfied or dissatisfied?</i></p> <p>(5=very satisfied; ... 1=very dissatisfied)</p>

**Appendix Table 8** (Continued)

<b>Variable/ Indicator</b>	<b>Measures/Coding</b>
<b>Chinese and Taiwanese Nationalism index</b>	<p>Two factorial indexes built on factor analysis of the following 5-point measure items:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) <i>Some people say, if Taiwan could still maintain peaceful relations with the PRC after declaring independence, then Taiwan should establish a new, independent country. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? (5=strongly agree; ... 1=strongly disagree)</i></li> <li>2) <i>Some people say, even if the PRC decides to attack Taiwan after Taiwan declares independence, Taiwan should still become a new country. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? (5=strongly agree; ... 1=strongly disagree)</i></li> <li>3) <i>Some people say, if the economic, social, and political conditions were about the same in both mainland China and Taiwan, then the two sides should unify. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? (1=strongly agree; ... 5=strongly disagree)</i></li> <li>4) <i>Some people say, even if the gap between the economic, social, and political conditions in mainland China and Taiwan is quite large, the two sides should still unify. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? (1=strongly agree; ... 5=strongly disagree)</i></li> </ol>
<b>Self-assigned- Tongdu Orientation</b>	<p>A reconstructed scale based on a measure tapping 6 positions concerning the relationship between Taiwan and mainland China: (1=immediate unification; ... 6=immediate independence)</p>
<b>Economic Evaluation</b>	<p>A factorial composite index based on the following 3-point scale measures tapping sociotropic and pocketbook economic evaluation:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) <i>Would you say that over the past year, the state of the economy of Taiwan has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?</i></li> </ol>

Appendix Table 8 (Continued)

Variable/ Indicator	Measures/Coding
<b>Economic Evaluation</b> (Continued)	<p>2) <i>Would you say that in the forthcoming year, the state of the economy of Taiwan will get better, stay about the same, or get worse?</i></p> <p>3) <i>Would you say that over the past year, your own household's economic condition has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?</i></p> <p>4) <i>Would you say that in the forthcoming year, your own household's economic condition will get better, stay about the same, or get worse?</i></p> <p>(3=better; 2=about the same; 1=worse)</p>
<b>Candidate (traits) Ambivalence</b>	<p>A formulated index built on the measure items designed to tap candidate's traits concerning handling the president's job:</p> <p>1) <i>I'd like to ask you to evaluate the ability of two presidential candidates, how would you rate Tsai Ing-wen on a scale of 0 to 10?</i></p> <p>2) <i>How would you rate Ma Ying-jeou?</i></p> <p>3) <i>How would you rate Tsai Ing-wen on a scale of 0 to 10, if 0 means that you think the candidate does not understand the needs of ordinary people at all and 10 means that a candidate completely understands the needs of ordinary people?</i></p> <p>4) <i>How would you rate Ma Ying-jeou?</i></p> <p>5) <i>How would you rate Tsai Ing-wen on a scale of 0 to 10, if 0 means the candidate is completely incapable of protecting Taiwan's interests, and 10 means that the candidate is completely able to protect Taiwan's interests?</i></p> <p>6) <i>How would you rate Ma Ying-jeou?</i></p> <p>7) <i>How would you rate Tsai Ing-wen on a scale of 0 to 10, if 0 means the candidate is completely incapable of maintaining cross-Strait peace, and 10 means that the candidate is completely able to maintain cross-Strait peace?</i></p>

**Appendix Table 8** (Continued)

<b>Variable/ Indicator</b>	<b>Measures/Coding</b>
<b>Candidate (traits) Ambivalence</b> (Continued)	8) <i>How would you rate Ma Ying-jeou?</i> (8 to 10=positive response; 0 to 2=negative response, only more extreme responses are considered to be valid counts)
<b>Emotional Ambivalence</b>	A formulated index built on the measure items designed to tap emotion and affect responses: 1) <i>Has Tsai Ing-wen, because of the kind of person she is or because of something she has done, ever made you feel angry?</i> 2) <i>How about Ma Ying-jeou?</i> 3) <i>Has Tsai Ing-wen, because of the kind of person she is or because of something she has done, ever made you feel afraid?</i> 4) <i>How about Ma Ying-jeou?</i> 5) <i>Has Tsai Ing-wen, because of the kind of person she is or because of something she has done, ever made you feel hopeful?</i> 6) <i>How about Ma Ying-jeou?</i> (For these closed-ended question items, only extreme positive and/or negative responses such as “often” and/or “never” are used to construct the index) 7) <i>We'd like to get your feelings toward presidential candidates. How would you rate Tsai Ing-wen on a scale of 0 to 10?</i> 8) <i>How about Ma Ying-jeou?</i> (8 thru 10=positive response; 0 thru 2 =negative response)
<b>Party Ambivalence</b>	A formulated index built on the measure items designed to tap the ability of the two major competing parties to deal with major sociopolitical problems: 1) <i>On cross-Straits relations, how do you think the KMT and DPP compare?</i>

Appendix Table 8 (Continued)

Variables/ Indicator	Measures/Coding
<b>Party Ambivalence</b> (Continued)	<p>2) <i>On economic development, how do the two parties compare?</i></p> <p>3) <i>On reducing the gap between rich and poor, how do the two parties compare?</i></p> <p>4) <i>On resolving the problem of high property prices, how do the two parties compare?</i></p> <p>5) <i>On environmental protection, how do the two parties compare?</i></p> <p>6) <i>On social welfare, how do the two parties compare?</i></p> <p>7) <i>On fighting corruption, how do the two parties compare?</i></p> <p>8) <i>On democratic reform, how do the two parties compare?</i></p> <p>9) <i>On ethnic harmony, how do the two parties compare?</i></p> <p>10) <i>On raising our international status, how do the two parties compare?</i></p> <p>(Only specific positive or negative responses toward the DPP and KMT are counted. The response that one party is “a little better” or “much better” than the other is counted as positive for that party and negative for the other)</p>
<b>Parties all good</b>	A summated index built on counting those 10 measure items with answering “both-parties-are-pretty-good” response.
<b>Parties all bad</b>	A summated index built on counting those 10 measure items with the response “neither party is good.”
<b>Partisan Vote-choice</b>	Voted for incumbent President Ma Ying-jeou (coded=0), and voted for DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen (coded=1); candidate of third party, James Soong 宋楚瑜, only secured 2.8 per cent of the total popular vote, so he has been dropped from the analysis.

